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Comment
Strict in Theory, but Not Fatal in Fact:
Hunter v. Regents of the University of California
and the Case for Educational Research as a
New Compelling State Interest
Jason Walbourn*
Not unlike other urban school districts throughout our na-
tion, the Los Angeles Unified School District faces substantial
obstacles in providing a quality education for its communities'
children.1 High drop-out rates, crime and an influx of non-
English speaking students create constant impediments to
quality public education.2 In response to these types of prob-
lems the Graduate School of Education and Informational
Studies (GSE & IS) at the University of California at Los An-
geles (UCLA) operates the Corinne A. Seeds University Ele-
mentary School (UES).3 UES is a laboratory school, intended
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A.,
1996, Hobart College.
1. During the 1995-96 school year the Los Angeles Unified School Dis-
trict had a drop-out rate of 8.8% as compared with 5.4% for Los Angeles
County and 3.9% for the entire State of California. Almost 50% of the stu-
dents in the district spoke a language other than English as their primary
language, while statewide only about 25% of students were categorized as
"Limited English Proficiency." See California Department of Education, Cali-fornia Department of Education Website, (visited February 1, 1998) <http:ll
www.cde.ca.gov>.
2. See supra note 1 (discussing drop-out rates and language statistics).
Additionally, during the 1996-97 school year there were losses totaling more
than $8,000,000 in the Los Angeles County schools as a result of crime. There
were 546 assaults with a deadly weapon, 518 cases of robbery or extortion, 3
homicides, 8,402 property crimes, and 251 sex offenses in the Los Angeles
County schools. See California Department of Education, California Depart-
ment of Education Website, (visited August 15, 1998) <http://www.cde.ca.gov>.
It should be noted, however, that from the 1995-96 school year to the 1996-97
year overall crime in the Los Angeles County schools remained the same or
dropped in 6 of the 8 recorded categories. See id.
3. Although UES is located physically within the Los Angeles Unified
School District, it is a privately-run school and is not affiliated with the dis-
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to "conduct research relevant to the urban educational experi-
ence and to work with teachers, communities and schools to
disseminate that research to foster a more effective educational
system primarily for urban elementary students."4
In December of 1994, Gina F. Brandt and James K.T.
Hunter submitted an application for admission to UES for
their daughter, Keeley Tatsuyo Hunter.5 On this application
Ms. Brandt and Mr. Hunter identified Keeley's ethnic identity
as "Asian-American."6 Applicants are asked to identify their
racial/ethnic identity because admissions decisions are based
primarily on race. The purpose of such a system is to ensure a
student body representative of an urban school population. On
March 11, 1995, the school notified Keeley's parents that she
had not been accepted for admission to UES and would have to
attend another public school in the area.7 Keeley's mother, on
behalf of her daughter, brought a suit against UCLA8 claiming
that the UES admissions program discriminated against her
on the basis of race.9
In Hunter v. Regents of the University of California,10 the
District Court for the Central District of California held that
the educational research conducted by UES was a sufficiently
compelling justification to warrant the use of a race-conscious
admissions process. This decision is particularly significant
trict. UES has a student enrollment of approximately 460 children in pre-
kindergarten through sixth grade, ranging in age from four to twelve. See
Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
4 Id.
5. Keeley's parents hoped to enroll their daughter in the 1995-96 Early
Childhood (EC-1) Program at UES, a pre-kindergarten class for four-year-
olds.
6. Although the question was optional, the application provided the fol-
lowing list of racial/ethnic groups on the application under the heading
"Child's Ethnic Identity": African-American, Asian-American, Caucasian, La-
tino, Native American, Other (Mixed Race). See id. at 1321. Keeley is one-
quarter Asian-American and three-quarters Caucasian. See id. at 1318.
7. See id. at 1319.
8. More specifically, the plaintiff brought the action against defendants
The Regents of the University of California and Theodore R. Mitchell, Dean of
the GSE & IS as well as Vice Chancellor of Academic Planning and Budget at
UCLA. See id. at 1318.
9. Hunter brought the action against the Regents under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and against Dean Mitchell pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the alleged discriminatory conduct of the
parties. See id.
10. 971 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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because the racial classifications were used for a non-remedial
purpose. The Supreme Court, in contrast, has yet to identify a
situation in which the non-remedial use of a racial classifica-
tion or a race-conscious program is justified.1 Acceptance of
the Hunter decision by appellate courts could have serious im-
plications for the future of race-based jurisprudence. Not only
did the Hunter court articulate a heretofore unidentified com-
pelling interest, but it also opened the door for the potentially
greater use of non-remedial race-based classifications. In an
area fraught with volatile rhetoric, the Hunter case provides a
new avenue for dialogue and discussion.
Part I of this Comment focuses on the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the context of affirmative action, and
more specifically examines those interests that the Supreme
Court has found compelling and those it has rejected. Part II
details the facts of the Hunter case and the reasoning used by
the district court to conclude that educational research is a
compelling interest sufficiently narrowly tailored to overcome
strict judicial scrutiny. Part I analyzes the court's reasoning
and argues that the court correctly concluded from both a legal
and a policy perspective that educational research is a compel-
ling state interest. Additionally, this Comment posits that
educational research compares favorably to other compelling
interests that have been accepted by the Supreme Court as jus-
tifications for race-conscious programs.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN
EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE
Enacted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."12 This seemingly simple
11. See infra Part I.B. (discussing those justifications that have been
found sufficiently compelling to warrant the use of racial classifications).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One of the earliest and oft-quoted in-
terpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment is provided by Justice Harlan in
his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson: "There is no caste here. Our con-
stitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Some scholars have noted, however, that this notion of a color-blind law
1998]
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and straightforward principle has spawned an immense and
complex body of law. The security actually afforded by the
Equal Protection Clause is not nearly as far reaching as its
language may originally intimate or as may be commonly per-
ceived. 13 Fourteenth Amendment protection does not prohibit
need be read in the context of the sentences preceding Harlan's famous quote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it re-
mains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens.
Id. See generally Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded By Color: The New Equal
Protection, The Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 191, 192-99 (1997) (discussing the historical myth of colorblindness
and arguing that the present notion of colorblindness reinforces the status
quo and subjugation of racial minorities); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness,
Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Ac-
tion, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 316-24 (1994) (discussing the rhetoric of colorblind-
ness and noting that the language preceding Justice Harlan's famous quote is
blatantly color-conscious); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (arguing that the notion of color-
blindness used by the Supreme Court fosters white domination). A sharp con-
trast to this notion of a colorblind law is provided by Justice Burger in his
opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick: "As a threshold matter, we reject the conten-
tion that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-
blind' fashion." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980).
Scholars and commentators also disagree as to the intent of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the other Reconstruction Amendments. The language
of the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson indicates that the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted in order to provide newly freed slaves equal treat-
ment under the law. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 ("The object of the amend-
ment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law."). For a cogent discussion concerning the intent and understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER
ALEINKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER, 438-48 (3d ed.
1994) (containing excerpts from writings of Raoul Berger and Michael J.
Perry); Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the
Interpretations of its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L.
REV. 291, 294-300 (1996) (discussing the legislative history of the Freedman's
Bureau Bills and the Fourteenth Amendment); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L.
REV. 753, 755-88 (1985) (reviewing in detail the legislative history of various
race-conscious Reconstruction measures, including the Freedman's Bureau
Bills and the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. The Fourteenth Amendment only protects individuals from state ac-
tion. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment acts as a constraint on the states). It should also be
noted, however, that the Court has found the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to be congruent, so that the rights contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment are applicable to the federal government through the Due Proc-
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all classifications, only those classifications made by the gov-
ermnent14 that create distinctions between similarly situated
individuals. 5
Over time the courts have developed a two-tier equal pro-
tection analysis.16 Classifications that categorize by race or
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 215-18 (1995) (discussing the congruence of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("In view of
our decision that the Constitution prohibits states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government."). Thus, the Equal
Protection Clause now acts as a constraint equally on both state and federal
action. But see Powell, supra note 12, at 221-26 (arguing that the court has
mistakenly equated the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, beginning with its
misinterpretation of Bolling v. Sharpe); Bradford Russell Clark, Note, Judi-
cial Review of Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Reverse In-
corporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969 (1984).
14. For the remainder of this article, "government" will be used to refer to
both state and federal action. The distinction between state and federal ac-
tion is no longer salient in the context of racial classifications. See supra note
13 (discussing the congruence of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that all racial classifications, state or fed-
eral, are subject to strict scrutiny).
15. The rights discussed in the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to in-
dividuals, not to groups. See Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (finding
that "rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by
its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal
rights."). Additionally, the guarantee of equal protection created in the Four-
teenth Amendment does not preclude all classification, nor does it mandate
equal protection in all cases. The Supreme Court has explained this principle
as follows: "[Miost laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of per-
sons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply
keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are
in all relevant respects alike." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); see
also Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920).
16. Courts have made this two-tier distinction because the perceived in-
tent of the amendment was to protect racial minorities. Thus, racial classifi-
cations that offend the intent of the original law are particularly suspect. See,
e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (noting that "[tihe experience
of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of
some groups"). Furthermore, classifications that impinge on a fundamental
right, whether that right is explicitly grounded in constitutional text or arises
implicitly out of the penumbras of more explicit provisions, are also immedi-
ately suspect. See, e.g., id. at 217 n.15 ("In determining whether a class-based
denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its
source, explicitly or implicitly, therein."); Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) ("We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully con-
fined.").
1998]
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ethnicity17 or implicate a "fundamental right 18 are immedi-
ately suspect, while all other classifications receive more defer-
ential treatment. 19 Classifications that are immediately sus-
pect receive strict judicial scrutiny.20 Under the strict scrutiny
standard, the government must show: (1) that the classification
17. The Court first noted that racial classifications might be subject to a
heightened level of scrutiny in Justice Stone's opinion in United States v.
Carolene Products. Footnote four stated that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities." United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). As a result, "more searching judicial inquiry" may be necessary. Id.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding that "[all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
mediately suspect"); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(noting that "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality").
18. The Court has enumerated a short list of fundamental rights that
automatically receive strict scrutiny. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 (1969) (travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage);
Harper, 383 U.S. at 667, 670 (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-
20 (1956) (Black & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring) (judicial process); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation).
The Court's approach to education has been varied and inconsistent.
While the Court has held that education is not a fundamental right in the con-
text of equal protection analysis, the Court has consistently paid lip service to
the vital importance of education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-39 (1973) (concluding that because the right to edu-
cation is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not a
fundamental right). But see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24 (applying a heightened
level of scrutiny even though the court explicitly reaffirms Rodriguez).
19. Classifications other than race and national origin/ethnicity receive
either intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. Rational basis review
requires only that the state show a legitimate government interest that is ra-
tionally related to its objective. Intermediate scrutiny requires that an impor-
tant government interest be shown that is substantially related to the objec-
tive. Most classifications will receive rational basis review unless they fall
into one of the following categories, in which case they receive intermediate
scrutiny: gender classifications, alienage, and illegitimacy. See Clark v. Jeter,
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99
(1976) (gender); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 646-49 (1973)
(alienage). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(indicating that gender classifications may receive a level of scrutiny higher
than intermediate scrutiny by requiring an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" for gender-based government action); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (holding that age classifications receive
rational basis review); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19, 28-29 (holding that wealth
classifications are subject to rational basis review).
20. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 ("[All legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect....
[CIourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
[Vol. 83:183
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is necessary to further a "compelling interest"2 1 and (2) that the
use of the classification is "narrowly tailored" to serve that
"compelling interest."22 Racial classifications facing this ex-
acting standard have regularly been invalidated.23
The real challenge in this area has been posed by affirma-
tive action cases-those in which a government entity has cre-
ated a race-based classification for the express purpose of bene-
fiting a racial minority. The Supreme Court heard its first
affirmative action case in 1977.24 In a series of affirmative ac-
tion decisions over the course of the next two decades, the
Court charted a somewhat confused path of equal protection
jurisprudence. In 1978, only Justice Powell applied strict scru-
tiny to a college admissions program that utilized racial classi-
fications.25 It was not until 1995 that a majority of the Court
agreed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of re-
view applicable to all racial classifications made by the gov-
ernment.26 Throughout this period, the Supreme Court has
continually struggled with the question of what government in-
terests qualify as "compelling" and are thus sufficient to justify
the use of racial classifications.
21. The notion of a "compelling interest" was first used by Justice Frank-
furter in a concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265(1957), and by the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). See
Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny-From Strict Through Rational Bases-
and the Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REv.
745, 758 (1992); K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict Scrutiny, 31 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 397, 420 (1997). Pillai also noted correctly that "[tihe Court's descrip-
tions of 'compelling state interest' during the past three decades or more have
not been enlightening, and at times were contradictory." Id.
22. For an articulation of the strict scrutiny test, including both the
"compelling interest! and the "narrowly tailored" prongs, see Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The
burden of proof is on the government to prove both prongs of the strict scru-
tiny test once a classification is identified as differentiating on the basis of
race or ethnicity or as impinging on a fundamental right.
23. See McLauglin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (citing cases
holding racial classifications invalid).
24. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See infra
notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
25. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290 (noting that "[r]acial and ethnic distinc-
tions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exactingjudicial examination").
26. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224.
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF RACE-BASED GOVERNMENTAL
PROGRAMS
Over the course of the last twenty years, the Supreme
Court has had the opportunity to review a number of cases in-
volving racial classifications and to define those interests that
it finds "compelling." The Court first addressed an affirmative
action program in a higher education setting in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.27 Alan Bakke, a white appli-
cant to the medical school of the University of California at
Davis, filed suit claiming that the school had excluded him on
the basis of race, thus violating his right to equal protection.2 8
He was twice passed over for admission 29 while less
"numerically" qualified 30 minority applicants were admitted.
The Court held that the race-conscious admissions program
was invalid.31 However, a majority of the Justices also agreed
27. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. See id. at 277-78.
29. Bakke applied to the Medical School in both 1973 and 1974 and was
rejected both years. See id. at 276-77.
30. The Davis Medical School used two different admissions programs
when evaluating its applicants. See id. at 273-74. The regular admissions
program screened applications as they were received and offered interviews to
approximately one out of every six applicants. See id. Candidates who re-
ceived personal interviews in 1973 were evaluated by five different committee
members on a scale of 1 to 100 following their interviews, and by six commit-
tee members in 1974. See id. at 274. The candidates were ranked according
to their overall GPA, their GPA in science classes, their MCAT scores, letters
of recommendation, extracurricular activities, other biographical data, and
their interviewers' summaries. See id. In 1973 Bakke's score was 468 out of a
possible 500 and in 1974 his score was 549 out of a possible 600. See id. at
276-77.
In comparison, the special admissions program consisted of a separate
committee who received only those applications that were marked
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" in 1973, or that wished to
be considered a member of a "minority group" in 1974. See id. at 274. The
special committee, after evaluating candidates in a similar manner as the
general committee, presented its top choices to the general committee, where
they could be rejected, but where they were not compared to those candidates
ranked by the general committee. See id. at 275. The special committee rec-
ommended candidates until eight or sixteen of their recommendations had
been accepted, the prescribed numbers for 1973 and 1974, respectively. See
id. "In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with
grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower
than Bakke's." Id. at 277.
31. Four justices found that the Davis plan was invalid because it did not
comply with Title VI. See id. at 418, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part; joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice
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that admissions programs could take race into consideration in
certain instances. 32 Those five Justices indicated that racial
classifications would be permissible if used to remedy the ef-
fects of past discrimination at Davis Medical School. 33 Addi-
tionally, Justice Powell concluded that in the context of higher
education the goal of diversity, by itself, could be a compelling
state interest.34 Thus, in its first examination of an affirmative
action program, the Court made an important distinction be-
tween societal discrimination, which cannot be pinpointed to a
specific actor or group, and institutional discrimination by a
particular private entity or governmental unit.35
Seven years later, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,36 the Court addressed whether a collective bargaining
agreement that provided protection from layoffs to minority
employees, but not to non-minority employees, was prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment.37 In an opinion authored by
Justice Powell, a plurality of the Court applied a strict scrutiny
analysis 38 and concluded that the Mississippi plan violated the
Powell also found that the Davis plan was invalid, but reasoned that it did not
pass equal protection scrutiny. See id. at 320.
32. Justice Powell believed that race could be used as a "plus factor" in
admissions programs. See id. at 317. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, andBlackmun agreed with Justice Powell that admissions programs such as that
at Harvard would be permissible as long as the plan was necessary to remedy
the effects of past discrimination. See id. at 326 n.1.
33. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun explained that
"[g]overnment may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult
any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past ra-
cial prejudice." Id. at 325. Justice Powell noted in his opinion that the statehas a "substantial interest" in eliminating the identified effects of past dis-
crimination. See id. at 307. Justice Powell, however, also made it clear that
remedying societal discrimination was not a valid justification for an affirma-
tive action program. See id. at 307-10.
34. See id. at 312, 315-16 (asserting that the goal of attaining a diverse
student body is a compelling state interest in the context of higher education).
35. Institutional discrimination refers to a situation in which a particularinstitution has perpetuated discrimination by its own acts or policies and the
effects of those policies continue to be visible. Societal discrimination refersinstead to a broader conception of discrimination that cannot be pinpointed to
a specific actor or institution.
36. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Minority teachers were protected from the
agreement's general rule of seniority-based layoffs to the extent that the sen-iority rule would decrease the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed. See id. at 270-71.
37. See id. at 270-72.
38. See id. at 273-74. After articulating the traditional two-pronged strict
scrutiny analysis, Justice Powell wrote: "[W]e must decide whether the layoffprovision is supported by a compelling state purpose and whether the means
1998]
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Equal Protection Clause.39 The Jackson school board had ar-
gued that minority teachers acted as role models for minority
students, helping to remedy the effects of past societal dis-
crimination. 40 The Court concluded that the layoff plan was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny re-
view.41 It also made clear, as it did in Bakke, that remedying
societal discrimination, without more, is not a valid justifica-
tion for the use of racial classifications. 42 A valid justification,
the Court asserted, would require a factual determination that
there was a strong basis in evidence that remedial action was
necessary to remedy institutional discrimination.4 3
Having failed to marshal a majority on the proper stan-
dard of review for local governmental classifications, the Court
next addressed the appropriate level of scrutiny for congres-
sionally mandated racial classifications. In Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, a case that has since been overruled, 4 the
Court for the first time upheld a non-remedial justification for
a race-based classification. Metro Broadcasting involved FCC-
sponsored minority preference policies.45 The Court employed
the less rigorous intermediate level of scrutiny46 and found that
chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored." Id. at 274. The
Court was still unable to fashion a majority on the issue of the proper stan-
dard of review with only three justices joining Justice Powell in Part 11 of the
opinion, which articulated strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of re-
view. See id. at 269.
39. See id. at 283-84.
40. See id. at 274.
41. See id. at 283, 294.
42. See id. at 276.
43. See id. at 277-78 (noting that "[tihe trial court must make a factual
determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclu-
sion that remedial action was necessary"). The Court used a similar formula-
tion of the "strong basis in evidence" standard in Shaw v. Hunt, reasoning
that to rise to the level of a compelling interest there must be "identified dis-
crimination" and a "'strong basis in evidence' to conclude that remedial action
[is] necessary." Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996).
44. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
45. See id. at 552 (briefly describing the two policies in question).
46. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to programs mandated by
Congress, holding that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress ... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve impor-
tant governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 564-65. Thus,
according to the Court's opinion in Metro Broadcasting, strict scrutiny was
applied to state and local governmental classifications while intermediate
scrutiny applied to federally-mandated classifications.
[Vol. 83:183
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in the context of broadcasting, the promotion of program diver-
sity was an important governmental objective.47
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,48 the Court over-
ruled Metro Broadcasting4 9 and held that all racial classifica-
tions, whether imposed by a federal, state, or local government,
are to be analyzed using strict judicial scrutiny.50 Adarand in-
volved a federal program that provided an incentive for con-
tractors working on government projects to hire "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals" for subcontracts.51
The Court did not reach the issues of whether the governmen-
tal interests were compelling or the means narrowly tailored,
and remanded the case for consideration of those issues.52
Over twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court
heard its first affirmative action case. It took nearly the full
twenty years for the Court to decide that all racial classifica-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny.53 Thus far, the only interest
that the Court has recognized as "compelling" is that of reme-
47. See id. at 566.
48. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
49. The Court maintained that its decision in Metro Broadcasting, ap-
plying intermediate scrutiny to a federal affirmative action program, had de-
parted from previous precedent. See id. at 225-27.
50. See id. at 224. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that "we hold
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or lo-
cal governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental inter-
ests." Id. at 227. The Court asserted that three propositions should be fol-
lowed when dealing with racial classifications: skepticism, consistency, and
congruence. See id. at 223-24.
5. Id. at 204. Under the federal program, African-Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities
were presumed to be "socially and economically disadvantaged." See id. at
205.
52. See id. at 237.
53. The Court's first majority opinion regarding the standard of review
for a race-based governmental program occurred in City of Richmond v. JA
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Court invalidated an affirma-
tive action program in the construction industry, agreeing that state and local
government racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 493-
94 (adhering to the strict scrutiny standard of review as described in Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 520 ("I agree.., with Jus-
tice O'Connor's conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied to all govern-
mental classification by race.") (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court did not,
however, address the proper standard of review for congressionally-mandated
affirmative action programs.
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dying institutional discrimination.5 4 A majority of the Court
has yet to find any non-remedial justification compelling.
In the wake of Adarand, lower courts and commentators
have been quick to put their own spin on the Court's opinion.55
One of the most recent cases addressing the issue of race-based
classifications in the higher education setting is Hopwood v.
Texas.5 6 In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit held that the University
of Texas Law School's admissions program was unconstitu-
tional because it used racial classifications to achieve a diverse
student body.57 Noting that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
was not controlling,58 the Fifth Circuit stated that "any consid-
eration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment."59 The strong language of
the Hopwood opinion has led more than one law school to
amend its admissions program and has caused apprehension
that Hopwood could signal the demise of affirmative action
programs in higher education.6 0
54. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990); Wy-
gant, 476 U.S. at 277.
55. See Kathryn K. Lee, Surviving Strict Scrutiny: Upholding Federal
Affirmative Action After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
929, 951-61 (1996) (arguing that strict scrutiny does not mean the death of
affirmative action at the federal level). For a list of articles discussing the
impact of Adarand, see id. at 932-33 n.14.
56. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
57. See id. at 934.
58. See id. at 944. The court maintained that Justice Powell's opinion is
not binding precedent because no other justice joined in the section of the
opinion discussing the diversity rationale. See id. The court also reasoned
that there have been no cases since Bakke that have found diversity to be a
compelling state interest and that "Supreme Court precedent shows that the
diversity interest will not satisfy strict scrutiny." Id. The court went on to
speculate that the only compelling state interest to justify race-based classifi-
cation is the remedying of past discrimination. See id.
59. Id. at 944.
60. The Attorneys General of Colorado and Georgia have urged public
colleges in their states to dismantle racial preferences. See Patrick Healy,
California Colleges Will Stop Designing Some Classes for Specific Ethnic
Groups, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 21, 1996, at A26 (Colorado Attorney
General urging end to affirmative action in state higher education); Georgia
Colleges Ordered to Drop Racial Preferences, WASH. POST, April 10, 1996, at
A20. Additionally, the University of Houston Law Center, Texas Tech Uni-
versity Law School and the University of Mississippi have also adjusted their
admissions programs in response to Hopwood. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,
Getting It Wrong: Hopwood v. Texas and Its Implications for Racial Diversity
in Legal Education and Practice, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 831, 884-85 n.226
(1997).
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11. HUNTER V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA
In Hunter v. Regents of the University of California,61 the
United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia upheld the use of racial and ethnic criteria in the Univer-
sity Elementary School's admissions program.6 2 Employing the
traditional strict scrutiny standard of review, the court found
that the UES program was "narrowly tailored to serve the pur-
pose of a compelling state interest."63 Thus, the court con-
cluded, the race-conscious admissions program used by UES
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plain-
tiff, Keeley Tatsuyo Hunter."
The admissions program at issue did not focus on test
scores or personal interviews as a typical admissions program
might, but did consider the ethnic and racial identity of its ap-
plicants.65 In doing so it attempted to achieve a racially and
ethnically diverse class that would further its educational re-
search.66 In essence, UES used racial classifications in order to
formulate a class that would act as a "sample" population for
its research and that would mirror a typical class in an urban
school. Applicants were asked to identify their child's ethnic
identity on the application form, although the question was op-
tional.67 The admissions committee68 then set a target for the
number of students to be admitted from each racial or ethnic
group.69 Next, the committee used randomly selected lists of
61. 971 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
62. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (explaining in detail the
UIES admissions program).
63. Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1332.
64 See id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants illegally and uncon-
stitutionally discriminated against her on the basis of her race pursuant to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra note 9
and accompanying text.
65. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1320.
66. See id-
67. The application provided the following list of racial or ethnic groups:
African-American, Asian-American, Caucasian, Latino, Native American,
Other (Mixed Race). See id. at 1321.
68. The DES admissions committee was made up of three UES teachers
and two GSE & IS faculty members, one of whom serves as committee chair-
person. See id. at 1320.
69. See id. The eventual demographic breakdown of the 1995-96 EC-1
class was the following. 10 Latinos (21.7%); 6 African-Americans (13%); 4
Asians (8.7%); 18 Caucasians (39.1%); and 8 mixed race (17.4%). See id. at
1321.
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students from each racial/ethnic group to fill the appropriate
number of seats allocated to each group.7 0
A. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF APPLICANTS
The court first determined that the admissions program
employed by UES warranted strict scrutiny review because it
treated similarly situated students differently.7 1 The court
reasoned that the admissions committee's original act of sort-
ing the applications by race and ethnicity constituted a differ-
entiation of the students.72 From the moment of classification,
a child's opportunity for admission was automatically and nec-
essarily either benefitted or harmed, depending on the racial
category into which the application was placed.7 3 Based on its
finding that similarly situated applicants were treated differ-
ently on account of their race or ethnicity, the Court deter-
mined that the UES program "must withstand strict scru-
tiny."74
B. A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST: EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH
After the initial determination that the admissions pro-
gram warranted strict scrutiny review, the court turned to the
70. See id. at 1320. It should be noted that before the admissions com-
mittee sorted and selected candidates based on their racial/ethnic group, they
admitted certain candidates for other reasons. The committee first identified
and admitted the siblings of current UES students who had applied for ad-
mission. The committee also admitted dominant Spanish-speaking applicants
in order to create a larger sample of students for bilingual research. Finally,
the committee sorted the candidates to ensure adequate gender and income
group balances. Additionally, the Dean of GSE & IS was allowed to admit a
certain number of applicants each year at his discretion for such purposes as
faculty and staff recruiting. See id. at 1320-21.
71. See id. at 1323.
72. See id. (noting that "the Admissions Committee's employment of a lot-
tery system does not negate its initial disparate treatment of similarly situ-
ated persons as a result of having first divided the applicants by their race
and ethnicity").
73. See id. at 1323.
74. Id. The court noted that the Regents and UES failed to distinguish
its program procedurally from the admissions program in Bakke, even though
they were able to prove that the programs were substantively different. See
id. at 1324 n.14. Additionally, the court compared the two admissions pro-
grams, concluding that in each case the plaintiffs chance of admission was
impacted by the number of other students within the same racial category.
See id. at 1324 The court concluded that "[flor this reason, UES's admission
policy cannot be shielded from strict scrutiny." Id.
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first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis: did the admissions
program further a compelling state interest? 5 The Board of
Regents asserted there were two compelling interests for the
UES program.7 6 First, it argued that the state had a compel-
ling interest in the procurement and dissemination of educa-
tional research concerning urban educational strategies.77 Sec-
ond, the Regents argued that there was a compelling state
interest in promoting academic freedom.7 8 Hunter countered
that the program should be struck down because it did not at-
tempt to remedy past or present discrimination, and that as a
matter of law, no other interest could rise to the level of a
"compelling interest."79
The court rejected Hunter's argument that every asserted
state interest that is not an attempt to remedy past or present
discrimination is per se invalid.8 0 Relying primarily on opin-
ions by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, Judge Kenyon wrote,
"this Court cannot conclude that the only constitutional form of
race-conscious decisionmaking must remedy past discrimina-
tion."8' In rejecting the plaintiffs argument the court also re-
fused to "conform its ruling to those non-mandatory decisions
already reached by other Circuit Courts." 2 The court reasoned
that the unique nature of Hunter's case distinguished it from
75. See id. at 1324.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. The plaintiff also argued that both justifications provided by
the Regents were too amorphous and lacked the evidentiary support neces-
sary to withstand strict scrutiny review. See id.
80. See id. at 1327.
8L Id. The plaintiff had based its argument for this proposition primar-
ily on the plurality opinion in Croson. See id. at 1324-25. After quoting di-
rectly from Justice Stevens's opinion in Croson regarding the potential value
of race-based classifications for non-remedial purposes, the court noted that
"[als far as this Court may ascertain, no majority of the Court has ever ex-
plicitly held that remedial action may constitute the only valid compelling
state interest." Id. at 1325. The court also referred to concurrences from both
Justice O'Connor in Wygant and Justice Stevens in Metro Broadcasting as
support for its position. See id. Judge Kenyon then pointed out that the non-
remedial interest of racial diversity in Metro Broadcasting was not explicitly
overruled in Adarand. See id. at 1326. Adarand only overruled Metro Broad-
casting with respect to the standard of review to be applied to racial classifi-
cations. See id.
82. Id. at 1326. The court noted its concern with decisions by the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in prominent Fourteenth Amendment
cases. See id. at 1326-27.
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recent equal protection cases decided in other jurisdictions.83
In support of its decision the court noted that "[u]nfortunately,
this case raises many issues which prevent it from fitting
neatly in line with one of the Supreme Court's prior rulings, or
other circuit courts' interpretations of those rulings. 84
The court then turned specifically to the interests asserted
by the Regents and concluded that although academic freedom
was not a compelling state interest, educational research in-
tended to benefit society at large was, in fact, a compelling in-
terest.85 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the
Regents offered sufficient evidence to carry the dual burden of
"(1) identifying a substantial and worthwhile need to maintain
the research conducted at UES; and (2) providing a strong ba-
sis in evidence that the use of racial classifications in the UES
admission policy is necessary. 86 The court, noting earlier Su-
preme Court decisions, held that the maintenance and im-
provement of the public school system was a substantial state
interest.87 Further, the court explained, the school's mission to
disseminate its research to the broader educational community
provided additional support to satisfy the first prong of the
analysis-identifying a substantial and worthwhile need to
maintain the research conducted at UES. 88
Addressing the "strong basis in evidence" prong of its test,
the court explained that although UES did not need to prove
that the research conducted at the school will necessarily
83. See id. The plaintiff had argued that the Court should conform its
ruling in this case to those decisions concerning affirmative action in other
Circuit Courts. Id. Each of the five circuits mentioned had invalidated af-
firmative action programs. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. City of Philadel-
phia, 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1996) (challenging city's contractor set-aside
program), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 953 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944-45 (5th Cir.) (finding the University of Texas Law Schoors admission pol-
icy unconstitutional), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Podberesky v. Kir-
wan, 956 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1992) (contesting the university's minority
scholarship program), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995); Milwaukee County
Pavers Ass'n v. Fieder, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir.) (challenging minority sub-
contractor preferences), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
84. Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1327.
85. See id. at 1324, 1328.
86. Id. at 1328.
87. See id. The court justified its conclusion by relying on Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982), Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), and Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) for the proposition that "[tihe judici-
ary has long-recognized that a state's need to provide its citizenry with a
quality education is compelling." Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328.
88. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
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guarantee improvement in elementary education, "strong evi-
dence exists that the research performed at UCLA will help ef-
fectuate meaningful change in urban elementary schooling."89
In order to effectuate such change and carry out its mission of
disseminating such information, the court determined that the
school "must be permitted to admit a student population that
presents similar issues and challenges that arise in the ethni-
cally diverse student population now present in the urban
school community."90
C. THE UES PROGRAM IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROWLY TAILORED
After announcing its finding that educational research was
a compelling state interest, the court then moved to a discus-
sion of whether the particular admissions program employed
by UES was sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.91 It concluded that the admissions program was ade-
quately tailored 92 and rejected several specific alternatives
proposed by the plaintiff.93 It first determined that it was nei-
ther reasonable nor possible for UES to achieve a racially di-
verse student population by using a random sampling tech-
nique or other alternative means.94  The court rejected
Hunter's assertion that increased use of outreach programs or
the use of actual urban public schools were adequate alterna-
tives to the race-conscious admissions program.95
The court also rejected Hunter's argument that the per-
centage of minorities admitted by UES must correlate exactly
with the demographics of Californian urban schools. 96 Moreo-
ver, the court declined to force UES to base its percentage of
minority enrollees on a "typical" urban school. The court main-
89. Id- at 1329. The court relied on the testimony of several experts who
testified during the trial to the necessity of such an admissions program. See
id. The court once again distinguished the program in this case from the one
in Bakke. The court argued that all research necessarily carries with it the
possibility of failure, but that the defendants showed a sufficient nexus in this
case between the research and the educational problems in California's urban
schools. In contrast, there existed no nexus between the reserved class spaces
and improved minority health care. See id. at 1329-30.
90. Id. at 1328.
91. See id. at 1330.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 1330-32.
94. See id. at 1330.
95. See id. at 1330-31.
96. See id. at 1331.
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tained that it was not clear whether or not a "typical" urban
school setting exists.97 Finally, the court found that attempting
to implement a similar research program in the state's existing
urban schools would not be feasible, due in large part to the
need for close parental involvement and support.98 It noted
that the "laboratory" school provides a unique environment
that can be closely controlled, enabling research that would be
difficult to administer in a public school setting.99
Accordingly, the Hunter court entered judgment for the
Regents and Dean Mitchell and vacated the preliminary in-
junction that had been entered in September of 1995.'00 The
court concluded that "[t]he defendants have successfully
proven that the use of racial and ethnic identity criteria in
UES's admission policy is narrowly tailored to serve the pur-
pose of a compelling state interest." °1
Ill. A NEW COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST:
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
The Hunter court determined that educational research
was a compelling state interest and that the UES admissions
program was sufficiently narrowly tailored to overcome strict
scrutiny. The court reached the correct result, basing its deci-
sion on sufficient legal precedent and important public policy
considerations. It correctly focused its analysis on UES's pri-
mary function as a research institution rather than on the edu-
cational aspect of the school. Additionally, the interest in edu-
cational research asserted by the state compares favorably
with other interests that have been asserted in support of ra-
cial classifications.
A. HUNTER V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IS
NOT AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASE
One of the primary difficulties with the Hunter case is that
it is unlike any other case involving racial classifications.
Bakke and its progeny have dealt primarily with race-based
programs designed directly to remedy the effects of discrimina-
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1332.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
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tion, usually in either an educational or workplace setting.10 2
The paradigmatic affirmative action case involves a post-
secondary educational institution that uses racial classifica-
tions in order to further the goal of diversity or to remedy the
present effects of institutional discrimination.10 3
The California Board of Regents in Hunter, however, did
not assert a remedial justification, nor did it implement an af-
firmative action program. 0 4 As a result, it created a situation
where the application of Supreme Court precedent is forced
and unnatural. Wisely, the Hunter court opted for a flexible
application of the law rather than attempting to force this case
into a rigid and inapplicable framework. The unique nature of
this case prompted the court to expand the analytic framework
of equal protection jurisprudence to include a non-remedial
justification for a race-conscious program.
There are several reasons why Hunter is not properly la-
beled an affirmative action case. Perhaps the most important
is that the racial classifications used by UES do not attempt to
further the diversity of the school or to remedy some type of
past institutional or societal discrimination, but instead are
employed solely to provide an adequate scientific sample for
the research performed at UES.105 The findings of fact issued
by the Hunter court make clear that the race-conscious admis-
sions program of UES is not used as a part of a larger affirma-
tive action program.106
Further evidence lies in the fact that the school makes
admissions decisions based almost entirely on the race of the
applicant.107 The program does not use race as one factor
102. See supra Part I.B. (identifying the major affirmative action cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court, all involving affirmative action programs in an
educational or employment context).
103. There have also been a number of cases involving affirmative action
programs in the contracting setting. However, because Hunter is logically
more similar to affirmative action programs implemented in an educational
setting, a comparison between Hunter and contracting cases is excluded.
104. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the justifi-
cations provided by the Board of Regents in Hunter).
105. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1327 ( Unlike Bakke, Wygant, Croson,
Metro Broadcasting, Shaw I, Adarand, and Shaw II, this Court need not con-
cern itself with a proffered compelling state interest of remedying the effects
of past or present discrimination. Nor do defendants assert a need to admit a
multicultural student body for the sole reason that racial diversity... satis-
fies a compelling state interest.").
106. See id. at 1320.
107. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing the admis-
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among many in admitting applicants, but instead admits stu-
dents based on predetermined percentages for each racial cate-
gory.108 Race is not used as a proxy, but is itself one of the most
important factors in the admission decision. It seems unlikely
that any school adhering to such a blatantly race-conscious
policy would claim to be administering an affirmative action
program, especially in light of Supreme Court precedent. It
strains credulity to maintain that such an admissions policy
could pass constitutional muster as an affirmative action pro-
gram. As Supreme Court precedent has indicated, only af-
firmative action programs that use race as one factor in the
admissions decision are legitimate, not programs that base
admission entirely on the race of the applicant. 0 9
Furthermore, unlike previous racial classification cases,
Hunter does not fit neatly into the normal educational context.
While UES fits into the generic rubric of education, it differs
from the types of institutions typically associated with an edu-
cational setting. Although UES is intended to operate just as
any other elementary school, the ultimate purpose 10 of the
school is to conduct educational research and to disseminate
the results of that research to other schools throughout Cali-
fornia and the country."' That unique mission makes UES
sions procedures at UES).
108. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1320 (finding that "the Admissions Com-
mittee... formulated a target number for each racial/ethnic group to be ad-
mitted"). The only other factors that are evaluated in the admissions program
are whether the applicant's sibling attends the school and whether the appli-
cant speaks a second language. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
109. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1979)
(describing the Harvard admissions program as an example of a plan that
does not adhere to rigid quotas but instead uses race as a plus factor in ad-
missions decisions).
110. See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the stated mission of the
UES).
111. One of the UES admissions brochures describes the school in the fol-
lowing manner:
As a laboratory school, its primary functions are research on effective
educational strategies and dissemination of new knowledge about
educational practice to teachers and administrators throughout the
state and nation.... Seeds UES is also a center for the education and
training of teachers and educational leaders.
Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328 (quoting UES's Fall 1995 admissions brochure).
Additionally, parents are required to sign a consent form when submitting
applications for their children that contains the following language discussing
the function of the school:
The Seeds University Elementary School serves, in its central func-
tion, as an official University laboratory for research and inquiry in
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distinct from any other school in the country and demonstrates
that the primary function of the UES is research, not educa-
tion. This is underscored by the Hunter court's own language:
"Students enrolled at UES are research subjects and are cov-
ered by all federal, state and university guidelines, rules and
policies regarding the treatment of human subjects.""2 Thus,
the UES is more accurately labeled a research institution than
an educational institution."3 The application of affirmative ac-
tion case law, therefore, becomes quite problematic.
The Hunter court was correct in recognizing the unique
nature of this case n1 4 and in avoiding the traditional analysis
that would normally accompany a race-conscious admissions
program used in an educational setting. The court seemed
cognizant of the fact that previous case law did not contem-
plate the unique facts of the admissions program at UES and
that as a result, a more creative and flexible framework was
necessary in order to adequately determine whether educa-
tional research was a compelling state interest.
B. THE HUNTER COURT CONSTRUCTED AN APPROPRIATE TEST
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
CONSTITUTES A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
The Hunter court created a workable and effective test for
determining whether a non-remedial justification for a racial
classification constitutes a compelling state interest. The Su-
preme Court's two part "compelling interest test," initially ar-
ticulated in Wygant'15 and used in both Croson'1 6 and Shaw v.
education. In seeking admission of your child to the University Ele-
mentary School, you express your acceptance of the fact that your
child, if admitted, will be enrolled in an experimental school, in which
teaching methods, curriculum, school organization, and children's
learning and development will be continually under study.
Id.
112. Id. at 1320 (emphasis added).
113. Of course, the UES also functions as an educational institution, as its
very name makes clear. Even if the UES were merely a "school," however,
and not primarily a research institution, Hunter would still have been a
unique case, by virtue of the age of the students involved. The use of racial
classifications in educational settings has traditionally been limited almost
exclusively to postsecondary institutions.
114 Id. at 1327.
115. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)(requiring the finding of "prior discrimination" and "a strong basis in evidence
for conclusion that remedial action was necessary").
116. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989).
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Hunt,117 is inapplicable to a situation in which a non-remedial
justification is offered for a racial classification. The Supreme
Court's test assumes that the justification offered to support
the racial classification is remedial 18 and thus cannot be ap-
propriately applied to the facts of Hunter where the justifica-
tion offered for the program is non-remedial in nature.
Realizing that the test articulated by the Supreme Court
in Shaw and Croson was inapplicable to the facts of Hunter,
the Hunter court formulated its own two-pronged test, a test
based on the one provided in Croson but adapted to a non-
remedial setting. The court found it necessary for the govern-
ment to carry the dual burden of "(1) identifying a substantial
and worthwhile need to maintain the research conducted at
UES; and (2) providing a strong basis in evidence that the use
of racial classifications in the UES admissions policy is neces-
sary."1 19
Although the court's adaptation of the Croson test might,
at first glance, seem to break with Supreme Court precedent,
after a close analysis the court's reformulation appears legiti-
mate. The Supreme Court stated explicitly after its decision in
Croson that it 'ha[s] never set forth a general test to determine
what constitutes a compelling state interest.' 20 This implies
that although the two-pronged test used in both Croson and
Shaw might be required for any case in which a remedial justi-
fication is asserted, that test is not binding in other areas, in-
cluding a non-remedial justification for a racial classification.
Additionally, the Hunter court still required a "strong basis in
evidence" in order to uphold the use of the racial classifications
in the admissions program.121 It seems that the "strong basis
in evidence" language was the vital part of the test in the eyes
of the Supreme Court.122 The Hunter court was therefore suc-
117. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
118. The test assumes a remedial justification because it requires a finding
of discrimination in order to satisfy the first prong of the test. Without a
finding of institutional discrimination the test is inapplicable.
119. Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328 (citation omitted).
120. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994).
121. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328.
122. In Croson the Court stated: "None of these Tmdings,' singly or to-
gether, provide the city of Richmond with a 'strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action was necessary.' 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
The Court went on to discuss the "findings" at length before concluding. "[i]n
sum, none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified dis-
crimination in the Richmond construction industry." Id. at 505; see also Wy-
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cessful in formulating a test which preserved the Supreme
Court's intention of holding the use of racial classifications to
high evidentiary standards, while at the same time providing
an opportunity to move away from a traditional affirmative ac-
tion analysis and instead focus on the unique research aspect
of UES. Acceptance by other courts of the modified test em-
ployed by the Hunter court would provide the potential for
more widespread acceptance of non-remedial justifications for
race-conscious programs.
C. EDUCATION ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING TO
JUSTIFY THE USE OF A RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS PROGRAM
The Hunter court focused a substantial part of its analysis
on the fact that UES was primarily a research institution
rather than simply an elementary school. 23 In doing so, the
court shifted its analysis away from the question of whether
the state's interest in providing a quality education alone was
sufficient to uphold the admissions program and instead rea-
soned persuasively and correctly that the unique research as-
pect of the school tipped the scales in favor of finding a com-
pelling state interest. Had the court analyzed the case
according to the validity of providing a quality education as the
lone compelling state interest, it would have been forced to
strike down the program.
This case could easily have been framed solely as an edu-
cation case. In fact, the court began its analysis by noting that
"[tihe judiciary has long-recognized that a state's need to pro-
vide its citizenry with a quality education is compelling."' 24 By
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) ("[A] public em-
ployer.., must ensure that.., it has convincing evidence that remedial ac-
tion is warranted.").
123. In its analysis the court stated that:
[Tihe principal purpose of the DES laboratory school is not simply to
educate its own student population. As previously discussed, UES's
primary mission as a program associated with the UCLA GSE & IS is
to conduct research and disseminate information regarding potential
innovations in urban elementary educational methods.
Hunter, 971 F.Supp at 1328.
124 Id. In support of this proposition the court provided the following ci-
tations: Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (recognizing "public schools as
a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (noting that
"[p]ublic education... fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to
its constituency"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)("Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
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making such a statement the court placed itself in a curious
position. Assuming, arguendo, that a state's interest in pro-
viding a quality education to its citizens is a compelling state
interest, it would be unnecessary for the court to continue the
analysis any further. After finding a compelling state interest
it could simply move on to the narrow tailoring prong of the
strict scrutiny test.125 However, the court did not take this ap-
proach, but instead engaged in a lengthy discussion of the im-
portance of the research aspect of UES.126
The court was correct in refocusing its analysis on the re-
search aspect of UES and realizing its importance in the ulti-
mate determination of whether a compelling interest was pres-
ent. The discussion was an integral part of the court's analysis
because the interest in providing a quality education does not,
by itself, support the use of racial classifications, despite the
court's claim that it is a compelling state interest. 27 While it is
clear that quality public education serves a vital role in our so-
ciety and is a primary function of our government, a state's in-
terest in providing education has only been found to be a com-
pelling state interest for the purpose of the strict scrutiny test
in a few limited situations, situations that are inapplicable to
the facts of Hunter.
Although courts at all levels have paid lip service to the
notion that the state's interest in providing a quality education
is compelling,128 in reality the interests they have found suffi-
ments.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.").
125. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing the two-
pronged strict scrutiny test).
126. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp at 1328-30.
127. Some commentators may agree with the Hunter court's analysis. Ste-
ven Gottlieb, for example, argues that "the [Supreme] Court has inferred a
government interest in education from the Constitution's provisions for demo-
cratic government. The Court has recognized compelling government inter-
ests in the inculcation of values in the schools, the duty to educate, knowledge
about public services, and an informed electorate." Stephen E. Gottlieb, Com-
pelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 958 (1988) (citations omitted).
128. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) ("The primary duty
of school officials and teachers.., is the education and training of its young
people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet
this responsibility."); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (stating that
"[plublic education, like the police function, fulfills a most fundamental obli-
gation of government to its constituency"); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist.,
73 F.3d 454, 462 (2nd Cir. 1996) (asserting that "[elducation is unquestionably
a legitimate state interest"); Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir.
1995) (stating that "[ilt is undisputed that the District has a compelling inter-
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cient to outweigh other constitutional rights have been much
narrower. To say generally that there is a compelling interest
in providing a quality education is overbroad. In fact, in the
three cases cited by the Hunter court for the proposition that
providing a quality education is a compelling state interest,
never once is the phrase "compelling interest" used.12 9 Instead,
those cases deal primarily with the importance of educational
institutions in furthering democratic principles and in trans-
mitting values from one generation to the next. In Plyler v.
Doe, the Supreme Court held that the state of Texas could not
deny public education to the children of illegal aliens. 130 In
that case the Court cited a number of previous cases in support
of the general proposition that education is of paramount im-
portance to our society.131 In Ambach v. Norwick, the Court fo-
cused on the function of schools in inculcating values to uphold
a citizenship requirement for New York state public school
teachers. 132 Finally, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
stressed the vital role of education in finding segregation to be
inherently unequal.1 33 It is not clear, therefore, from the cases
cited by the Hunter court that a state's general interest in pro-
viding a quality education has been found to be sufficiently
compelling to subordinate other constitutionally mandated
rights. The instances in which the courts have found educa-
tional interests to be compelling for the purposes of the strict
scrutiny test have been defined in very narrow terms, such as
the interest in a safe classroom environment, 134 and the inter-
est in prohibiting the use of vulgar and offensive language in
est in protecting the welfare and safety of its children while they attend
school. The education of children has long been recognized as a compelling
state interest."); Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "the state itself has a compelling interest in the health, educa-
tion, and welfare of children"); Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. 3:97-1249, 1998 WL 433916, at *20 (M.D. Tenn. July
29, 1998) ("[Tihe State has a compelling interest in ensuring that its children
obtain a high quality education .... "); St. Louis Developmental Disabilities
Treatment Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416, 1742 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (finding that "provision of a public education is a compelling state inter-
est").
129. See supra notes 87 and 124 and accompanying text (providing the
three cases cited by the Hunter court).
130. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982).
131. See id. at 221.
132. See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77.
133. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
134. See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a
compelling interest in campus safety).
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public discourse.1 35 It is therefore unclear that a general inter-
est in providing a quality education is alone sufficiently com-
pelling to subordinate equal protection rights.
Furthermore, if the state's interest in providing a quality
public education alone were a compelling state interest, a case
such as Bakke would not pose a particularly difficult issue.
Under the facts of Bakke,136 the state could have asserted that
its admissions program was an attempt to improve the quality
of education provided to the Davis medical students by ensur-
ing a more diverse student body and as a result a more vibrant
academic climate and healthier learning environment. Such a
claim, supported by a strong basis in evidence and given the
necessary deference for legitimate academic judgements, 137
would have defeated Bakke's equal protection claim.138 If the
general interest in providing a quality education were alone a
compelling state interest, affirmative action programs in
higher education would seemingly face much less of a legal
challenge.
Thus, although the Hunter court stated that providing a
quality education was a compelling state interest, alone it was
not sufficient to justify the use of racial classifications. The
findings of compelling interests in the area of education have
been very limited and do not apply to the facts of Hunter. This
does not, however, render the remaining part of the Hunter
court's analysis invalid.
D. THE HUNTER COURT CORRECTLY RELIED ON THE RESEARCH
ASPECT OF THE UES TO CONCLUDE THAT EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH IS A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Although the Hunter court made the error of stating that
the state's interest in providing a quality education was com-
pelling, the court did not rely completely on that finding to con-
135. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)(finding that prohibiting vulgar and offensive language is an appropriate
school function).
136. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
137. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) ("[C]ourts
have stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate aca-
demic judgments. This Court itself has cautioned that judges... asked to re-
view the substance of a genuinely academic decision... should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment.') (citation omitted).
138. The narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis would, of
course, also need to be satisfied. See supra notes 22 and 125 and accompany-
ing text.
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elude that educational research was a compelling state inter-
est.139 The court correctly refocused the emphasis of its analy-
sis on the research aspect of UES. In doing so, the court as-
tutely recognized that the research aspect of UES was critical
in finding that educational research was a compelling state in-
terest.
The research component of UES is of primary importance
because of its potentially far-reaching implications. As with
other research projects, although its immediate impact may be
felt only by a small population, it has the potential to produce
widespread benefits. 140 It is this unique characteristic that jus-
tifies the special treatment of research. In this case, while the
improvement of urban education in the Los Angeles area may
be the primary goal of the UES, the research has the potential
to benefit schools and children throughout the nation.'4 ' This,
along with the serious nature of the problems in the nation's
urban schools, 142 provides a strong justification for the court's
finding that educational research is a compelling interest.
By shifting its focus from the educational aspect of the
state's justification to the research aspect of UES, the court
was also able to avoid the problems of a Hopwood-type chal-
lenge to the program. In Hopwood, the court concluded that
the only legitimate justification for an affrmative action pro-
gram in an educational institution is that of remedying past
institutional discrimination.14 3 The Hopwood court stated that
the non-remedial justification of diversity supported by Justice
Powell in Bakke did not act as controlling precedent.1" In
striking down the University of Texas Law School's admission
program, the Fifth Circuit maintained that the opinions issued
by the Supreme Court following Bakke require a finding of past
discrimination before any affirmative action program may be
justified.145 Educational research, although distinct from di-
139. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328-30.
140. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting the mission of the
UES).
14L See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1328 (noting that "tIES's primary mis-
sion... is to conduct research and disseminate information regarding poten-
tial innovations in urban elementary education methods").
142 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (describing the holding
and legal reasoning of the Hopwood Court).
144. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that only Justice
Powell suppported the diversity rationale).
145. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing
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versity, would probably suffer the same defeat when analyzed
within the framework of Hopwood146 However, by classifying
the UES's race-based admission policy as a research tool rather
than an affirmative action program, the Hunter court avoided
any conflict with Hopwood. 147
E. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH AS A COMPELLING INTEREST: A COMPARISON OF
ATTRIBUTES
Although Hunter should not be viewed as an affirmative
action case, the court was forced to compare Hunter to other
cases in which race-conscious programs have been used. The
cases most closely analogous, therefore, are affirmative action
cases. The justifications used in those cases are instructive in
attempting to determine what factors the Supreme Court finds
convincing when attempting to determine whether a compel-
ling interest exists. 148 By evaluating the attributes of justifica-
tions that have been upheld in previous cases, it is possible to
discern criteria that the Supreme Court deems legitimate as
that "subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that
non-remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications").
146. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (explaining that past
institutional discrimination is a prerequisite for taking affirmative action).
147. This is not to say, however, that Hopwood was correctly decided. As
many others have argued, the Hopwood ruling is indefensible on both prece-
dential and policy grounds. See generally Laura Scanlan, Hopwood v. Texas:
A Backward Look at Affirmative Action in Education, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1580
(1996); Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Getting it Wrong: Hopwood v. Texas and its
Implications for Racial Diversity in Legal Education and Practice, 31 NEW.
ENG. L. REV. 831 (1997). The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari has left the
decision intact. As a result, the decision has had a widespread effect on af-
firmative action programs at colleges and universities throughout the country.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
148. The Supreme Court has provided little guidance to lower courts on
the issue of compelling interests. As recently as 1994, the Court noted that
there is no specific test to be used in determining compelling state interests.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Commentators have been critical
of the Court's reluctance to clarify this issue. For example, Stephen Gottlieb
has written that "while decisions of the Supreme Court and opinions of vari-
ous members of the Court have frequently described or treated governmental
interests as compelling, few have explained why." Stephen E. Gottlieb, Com-
pelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932 (1988). Sanford Levinson has
written that "anyone who actually teaches constitutional law knows that few
things are less clear than the operation of the compelling interest doctrine."
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On 'Due Process
of Lawmaking' and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1035, 1036 (1994).
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well as its rationales for dismissing other interests as not suffi-
ciently compelling. Comparing those attributes to the interest
of educational research provides further justification for find-
ing that educational research is a compelling government in-
terest.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to accept any non-
remedial justifications for race-based classifications because of
their tendency to be limitless in both time and scope.149 There
is no concrete ending point or sunset to a program that uses
role models or diversity as its justification. The same can be
said of remedying past societal discrimination. The Supreme
Court is wary of permitting remedies that cannot be mapped
out on a definable time line. The Court has expressed its un-
easiness by rejecting justifications that it claims are too
"amorphous."150 This concern seems to stem from the fact that
the Court views racial classifications and affirmative action
programs as deviations from the broader goal of equal protec-
tion. 51
Diversity in an educational setting has not been proferred
as a justification for an affirmative action program at the Su-
preme Court level since Bakke.152 Although Justice Powell
found diversity to be compelling, 153 diversity has been rejected
as a justification because it promotes the use of stereotypes
and has the potential to fuel further racial hostility.154 Simi-
149. The Wygant Court rejected the justification of societal discrimination,
warning that [uin the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their
ability to affect the future." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986). The Court made a similar point in Croson: "Like the 'role model'
theory employed in Wygant, a generalized assertion that there has been past
discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has no
logical stopping point.' City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
498 (1989) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275).
150. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(referring to past societal discrimination as "an amorphous concept of injury
that may be ageless in its reach into the past").
151. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (emphasizing that "findings serve to as-
sure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all ra-
cial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service
of the goal of equality itself).
152. Program diversity, however, was asserted as a compelling state inter-
est in Metro Broadcasting. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
154. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (warning that "[uinless [racial classifica-
tions] are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote no-
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larly, the use of any racial classifications, even if used to pro-
mote diversity, may cause stigmatization and do more harm
than good for minority students. 155 Additionally, opponents
claim that using racial classifications to promote diversity is
itself stereotyping.1 56 They argue that in order to achieve true
diversity, an institution should look not only at race and eth-
nicity but at all of the characteristics of an applicant.
The Supreme Court's rejection remedying societal dis-
crimination as a justification for racial classifications has
stemmed from the worry that if the door is opened for reme-
dying past societal wrongs for one group, the Court would be
forced to open it for all groups. 57 Specifically, the Court has
seemed to worry that allowing such a justification to stand
would permit competing claims of remedial relief to be asserted
by every group that has been disadvantaged in the past. This
would place the Court into the difficult situation of evaluating
the past discrimination suffered by every group of minorities
and making decisions about which group's claims deserved re-
medial action.158 Societal discrimination has also been rejected
as a viable justification because of the lack of definite state ac-
tion.159 The goal of the Fourteenth Amendment is to end ra-
cially motivated state action as opposed to the racially moti-
vated actions of individuals. 160 It is very difficult to identify a
specific state actor or state action when asserting the broad
tions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility").
155. See id.; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (suggesting that "preferential pro-
grams may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having
no relationship to individual worth").
156. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[diversity] may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote
improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility").
157. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (concluding that "to accept Richmond's
claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid
racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for 'remedial
relief for every disadvantaged group").
158. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-97 ("Courts would be asked to evaluate the
extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority
groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level
of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications . .. ").
159. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986) ("I
agree with the plurality that a governmental agency's interest in remedying
'societal' discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed
sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.").
160. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (explaining that private
discrimination is not covered under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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claim of societal discrimination, and consequently the Court
has been unwilling to recognize it as a valid justification for the
use of racial classifications or an affirmative action program.161
In contrast, remedying past institutional discrimination is
currently the only validated justification for the use of race-
conscious programs in higher education or in employment.162
The Court has accepted this rationale for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, it is viewed as legitimate because the pres-
ent effects of past discrimination are both identifiable and
quantifiable. 163 Consequently, the remedy is limited in scope
and can be monitored on a definite timetable. 164 When the ef-
fects of past discrimination are no longer visible, the justifica-
tion for the program no longer exists. Thus, the remedy has a
concrete ending point and a discrete time line. Additionally,
the state action that is lacking in the case of societal discrimi-
nation is clear in the case of institutional discrimination. The
institution originally responsible for the discrimination is the
one attempting to remedy it by the use of affirmative action.
The race-conscious remedy can therefore be focused on specific
prior harmful state action, and any possible negative conse-
quences of the classification system are minimized.
Educational research compares favorably with the as-
serted compelling state interests that the Supreme Court has
evaluated in the past and also promotes other unique values
that warrant the finding of a compelling interest. In Hunter,
racial classifications were used in one school in the state of
California, a school whose primary purpose is research. Thus,
the potential for a broad or unlimited scope of application does
not enter into this case as it has with other non-remedial justi-
fications. 165 In the cases of diversity166 and role models 167 the
161. This is of course not meant to indicate that past societal discrimina-
tion is not a legitimate concern or that its effects do not still permeate our so-
ciety, only that it is often difficult to link such a pervasive problem back to a
single state actor or action.
162. See supra notes 33 and 43 and accompanying text (discussing the
finding that the remedying of past discrimination is a compelling interest).
163. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)
(explaining that "proper findings... are necessary to define both the scope of
the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects").
164. See, e.g., id. (underscoring the temporary nature of remedial matters).
165. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text (discussing the prob-
lems of time and scope usually associated with non-remedial justifications).
166. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (asserting diversity as a
valid justification in Bakke).
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potential use of racial classifications was virtually unlimited.
Any school with a minority population could institute a pro-
gram using either rationale, a situation the Supreme Court
was unwilling to encourage. In the case of educational re-
search the potential for unlimited use of racial classifications is
much less likely.
Additionally, research entails a high degree of objectivity,
a quality that is important in an area as volatile as that of
race. As a result of the research philosophy of the school, UES
is not at all involved in evaluating discrimination or crafting a
plan that is intended to remedy past wrongs.1 68 The research
at issue in this case avoids these problematic value judgments
and instead focuses entirely on the issue of how to improve the
quality of urban education. In that sense the research main-
tains an dntiseptic quality and avoids problems of determining
who deserves remedies. Because courts seem wary of placing
themselves in situations where they are forced to make value
judgments concerning which groups warrant remedies, 169 the
type of plan used by the UES should be a welcomed relief.
The concern about stigmatic harm and increased racial
animosityl7 0 resulting from racial classifications also does not
apply to the UES program. First, the program does not deal
with college and graduate school students who are capable of
making sophisticated judgments concerning the use and utility
of racial classifications. While it is likely that college students
may make value judgments concerning the validity of another
student's qualifications based on his or her race, such problems
are unlikely to occur in an elementary school setting. Four-
year-old students are not likely to understand distinctions
based on race, especially in a community where there is such a
great amount of racial diversity.171 Additionally, even if the
students were able to make such racial determinations at such
167. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (asserting a state interest in
providing role models to minority students in Wygant).
168. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1320 (insisting that "the Admissions
Committee does not consider race or ethnic background as a remedy for past
societal discrimination").
169. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's concerns about evaluating claims of societal discrimination).
170. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (describing the
court's concern over the potential of racial classifications being counterpro-
ductive).
17L See supra note 1 and accompanying text (demographics of Los Angeles
Unified School District).
214 [Vol. 83:183
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
a young age, it is not clear that the UES program would result
in the stigmatic harm that can occur with other types of racial
classifications. UES does not set different standards for mi-
norities and non-minorities, nor does it offer preferences to one
group over another. It simply sets target sample populations
for different racial and ethnic groups in order to mirror the
demographic percentages in the general population and selects
randomly from self-identified racial groups to meet these speci-
fied targets. 7 2 The likelihood of stigmatic harm or increased
racial hostility as a result of such a program is highly unlikely
where no merit considerations enter into the decisionmaking
process.
Affirmative action programs that use diversity as their ra-
tionale attempt to recruit a diverse student body in order to
foster a more dynamic learning environment. That is not the
goal of the UES program. Instead, UES's goal is to achieve a
sample population that mirrors the demographic diversity of
the general population.17 3 There is no claim that diversity is
intended to offer the students of UES a better learning envi-
ronment. Therefore, the concerns that have been raised in
other diversity contexts are inapplicable to the situation pre-
sented in Hunter.
Finally, the research conducted by UES can be likened to
the justification of past institutional discrimination. Both justi-
fications are used, in a sense, to overcome institutional prob-
lems. The need for doing the type of research performed at
UES is evidence itself of institutional problems. This is made
clear by the language of the Hunter court: "Given the nature of
the problems currently plaguing the urban public school sys-
tem, especially in the Los Angeles Unified School District, it
would be presumptuous to assume that the State already pos-
sessed the answers to all of the complex questions about
teaching and learning methods."'7 4 The educational research is
remedial in nature because it is an attempt to discover and
solve the problems that exist in California's educational sys-
tem, and more specifically the problems faced by urban schools
in the Los Angeles Unified District. Although the Board of Re-
172. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing the UES
admissions program).
173. See Hunter, 971 F. Supp. at 1320 ("UES considers its applicants' race
and ethnic identities only in an attempt to obtain an adequate crosssample of
the general populaton ...
174. Id. at 1329.
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gents may not be responsible for all of the problems that occur
in the Los Angeles Unified District, the government of which it
is a part is ultimately responsible for the performance of the
schools in that district and the education of the state's chil-
dren.
F. PoLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR THE FINDING THAT
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH IS A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST
In addition to the legal justifications for finding a compel-
ling state interest in educational research, significant policy
considerations weigh in favor of finding a compelling inter-
est.175 To find an equal protection violation in this case would
lead to the possibility of absurd results in other areas of scien-
tific research.
A decision in favor of Keeley Hunter would essentially give
her the right to become part of a scientific research project. A
similar decision in a case involving more traditional research
would produce an absurd result. Assume that the Medical
School at the University of Minnesota was interested in per-
forming research on the effects of sickle cell anemia in African-
American men.17 6 Assume further that the University took out
an advertisement in the local paper to attract African-
American men to participate in the study. If the University,
clearly a state actor, chose to limit its pool of research subjects
solely to African-American men, a white man interested in be-
ing part of the research project would seemingly have a valid
equal protection claim under the argument advanced by
Hunter. Few would argue that the white man would have a le-
gitimate claim, because it is clear that in this type of situation
the racial classification is not only appropriate, but necessary
to effectuate the goals of the research.
175. The Hunter court was "convinced that without a racially and ethni-
cally diverse student population, the benefits to be gained by these innova-
tions and studies would be lost. The defendants' practical purpose of operat-
ing a laboratory school ... would be further jeopardized by a marked decrease
in the credibility of future studies conducted at UES should the school fail to
maintain a student population reflective of the urban environment." Id.
176. Sickle cell anemia afflicts African-American males more than any
other group. See generally Charles Marwick, Trial Halted as Sickle Cell
Treatment Proves Itself, 273 JAMA 61 (1995); Yuet Wai Kan, Development of
DNA Analysis for Human Diseases: Sickle Cell Anemia and Thalassemia as a
Paradigm, 267 JAMA 532 (1992).
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Clearly, there is a substantial state interest in legitimate
scientific research, whether it is for education or sickle cell
anemia. Although there may be very few situations where the
use of government-sponsored racial classifications are appro-
priate, this is one of those situations. If research is to continue
to provide society with the benefits to which we have grown ac-
customed, courts must avoid interpreting the Constitution in
such a way as to unduly restrict legitimate and routine exer-
cises of discretion by researchers.
CONCLUSION
Hunter v. Regents of the University of California posed the
unique question of whether educational research should be
considered a compelling state interest for the purpose of strict
scrutiny analysis. While the Supreme Court has never upheld
the non-remedial use of racial classifications, the Hunter court
correctly determined that educational research is a compelling
state interest. By shifting the focus of its analysis from the
educational to the research aspect of the laboratory school, the
court was able to employ a flexible but persuasive argument for
finding a compelling state interest. This Comment suggests
that comparing educational research to other asserted justifi-
cations for racial classifications provides further support for
the court's conclusion. Although the court expanded the tradi-
tional framework used for analyzing race-conscious programs,
it relied on sound legal and policy justifications in reaching its
ultimate decision.
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